United Nations S/2008/752

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 December 2008

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Letter dated 2 December 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the eleventh report of the International Independent Investigation Commission, which was prepared pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006), 1748 (2007) and 1815 (2008).

The report provides the Security Council with an overview of the progress made by the Commission since its previous report to the Council, dated 28 March 2008 (S/2008/210). The Commission reports that it has acquired new information that may allow it to link additional individuals to the network that carried out the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. It also provides details of its assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of 20 other bombings and assassinations in Lebanon since October 2004 and an update on the links between those cases and the Hariri case.

The report follows my announcement that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is fully on track to commence functioning on 1 March 2009. For this reason, the Commission requests an extension of its mandate to 28 February 2009. This extension would enable it to continue its investigation without interruption and gradually transfer its operations, staff and assets to The Hague, with a view to completing the transition by the time the Tribunal starts functioning.

I wish to thank the staff of the Commission for their excellent work in extremely difficult circumstances. In particular, I wish to thank Daniel Bellemare, who took office as Commissioner on 1 January 2008, for his leadership in advancing the investigation and in providing continuity in the work of the Commission. I also would like to thank the Government of Lebanon for its continued cooperation and support.

I would be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council. Meanwhile, I am transmitting the report to the Government of Lebanon.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

08-63145 (E) 051208

Eleventh report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006), 1748 (2007) and 1815 (2008)

D. A. Bellemare
Commissioner

Beirut
December 2008

Summary

The Security Council requested the International Independent Investigation Commission to report to it on the progress of its investigation within six months of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1815 (2008) on 2 June 2008. The present report is the eleventh provided by the Commission, and the second report of Commissioner D. A. Bellemare, who took office on 1 January 2008.

The report provides an update on the progress that can be publicly reported. The Commission has acquired new information that may allow it to link additional individuals to the network that carried out the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The Commission also made further findings that help to identify the possible geographic origin of the suicide bomber.

Since its previous report, the Commission has also uncovered additional elements corroborating the connection between the Hariri attack and the other cases with which links had already been found. Preliminary indications also suggest that there may be a link between one additional case and the Hariri case.

The Commission continues to maintain regular contact and to interact closely with the Lebanese authorities on matters related to its investigations, as well as on matters relating to the security of the Commission and its staff. The Syrian Arab Republic has provided generally satisfactory cooperation.

The Commission's mandate currently ends on 31 December 2008. The Secretary-General has announced that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is fully on track to commence functioning on 1 March 2009. The Commission requests that its mandate be extended to 28 February 2009 so that it can continue its investigation without interruption. During the extension period the Commission would gradually transfer operations, staff and assets to The Hague with a view to completing the transition by the time the Tribunal starts functioning.

The launch of the Tribunal does not mean that the investigation has been completed. While extensive work has been done on the investigation, the Commission, and the Office of the Prosecutor, once it begins to operate, must continue to gather evidence that would support an indictment before the Tribunal.

The Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal will need to continue to investigate all the cases within the Commission's current mandate in order to establish which of the cases are connected to the Hariri case in the manner required under the statute of the Tribunal. It will also require the full cooperation and support of the Lebanese authorities, as well as all other Member States, in order to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions.

I. Introduction

1. The present eleventh report of the International Independent Investigation Commission is the second report of Commissioner D. A. Bellemare who took office on 1 January 2008.

2. In April 2005, in the aftermath of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the Security Council decided to establish an international independent investigation Commission based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act.[1] The approach of the Council at that time was that the investigation would be led by the Lebanese authorities, with the assistance of the independent Commission, and that prosecutions would be brought before Lebanese courts.

3. In 2007, that approach was changed. At the request of the Lebanese Government,[2] the Security Council created an international body, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (the "Tribunal"), with a dual mandate: to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of the Hariri assassination and related attacks. The Special Tribunal was to take the lead in the investigation and ultimately hold trials.[3]

4. On 30 November 2008, the Secretary-General stated that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was fully on track to commence functioning on 1 March 2009,[4] which means that the investigation will be led, from that time forward, by the Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal in The Hague.

5. While extensive work has already been done on the investigation, the Commission, and the Office of the Prosecutor, once it begins to operate, must continue to gather evidence that would support an indictment before the Tribunal.

6. The momentum of the investigation must be maintained in the transition from the Commission to the Office of the Prosecutor. To ensure that disruption is kept to a minimum during the transition process, the Commission notes that an extension of its mandate until the day the Tribunal commences functioning would both allow the investigation to continue uninterrupted and facilitate a phased selection and movement of staff.

7. The Commission is sensitive to the fact that the beginning of operations of the Tribunal and the upcoming move to The Hague have brought expectations to a peak. These expectations are that indictments naming perpetrators will be filed as soon as the move to the Tribunal is completed. Although these expectations are understandable, the move does not in fact mean that the investigation has been completed.

8. While the Commission shares the frustration of the Lebanese people with the uncertainty about the time needed to complete the investigation, it can but stay true to its obligation to be guided solely by facts and evidence and to conduct its investigation in accordance with international standards.

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[1] See Security Council resolution 1595 (2005). Since then the Council has also given the Commission a mandate to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in the investigation of 20 other attacks.

[2] See S/2007/281, annex.

[3] See Security Council resolution 1757 (2007), annex, attachment, article 4.

[4] Statement of the Secretary-General after his meeting with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora of Lebanon, Doha, 30 November 2008. See also S/2008/734, para. 34.

9. As the move to The Hague approaches, the Commission is aware that in order to earn the sustained commitment of the Lebanese people and the international community it must continue to inspire the confidence of the public in its independence and professionalism.

10. Public confidence in both the Commission and the Tribunal will also help people feel safe about approaching them with information, and in doing so will help bring an end to impunity in Lebanon. Victims also need to feel confident about the process, and in that regard the Commission has placed a renewed emphasis on victim outreach.

11. In fostering public confidence, the Commission needs partners. The media, particularly the Lebanese media, has a key role to play in this process. Through the press, the Commission will endeavour to ensure that the public is kept accurately informed about the nature of its work and the next steps in the process. To that end the Commission will assist the media in enhancing its grasp of the legal processes and concepts involved in the work of the Commission and the Office of the Prosecutor.

12. With these considerations in mind, the report will attempt to strike a delicate balance, providing as much information as possible, while maintaining the confidentiality necessary to the investigation. It will present (a) the environment in which the Commission operates; (b) the challenges it faces and the progress achieved; (c) the cooperation received from States; (d) the process of transition to the Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal; and (e) conclusions.

II. The environment

13. During the current reporting period the security environment has been volatile, and there was serious violence in May 2008. At that time, the movements of Commission personnel were severely restricted and interviews and other scheduled investigative activities had to be postponed.

14. Following the events of May 2008, sporadic violence continued to erupt in various parts of the country. In recent weeks the security situation has improved, although the security environment in Lebanon and the region remains fragile. As a result, movement remains restricted for Commission personnel in certain areas. In addition, as the Commission approaches its transition to the Tribunal, it remains cognizant of the need to protect its staff, premises and holdings. It is with this and other safety and security concerns in mind that additional measures have recently been taken to protect Commission personnel and assets.

15. During the reporting period there have been important developments on the political front in Lebanon, including the signing of the Doha agreement on 21 May 2008, the election of the President, the formation of the national unity Government and the resumption of the National Dialogue. The President and the new Government have both affirmed Lebanon's continued commitment to the Tribunal.[5] The ministerial statement of the new Government, which received a vote of confidence from the Lebanese Parliament, stipulated that:

[5] See A/63/PV.6, p. 14. See also inaugural speech of President Sleiman, 25 May 2008.

Lebanon reiterates its commitment to the International Tribunal established under Security Council resolution 1757 (2007) to investigate the assassination of martyr Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and his companions. Lebanon is cooperating with the relevant organs of the United Nations to bring the truth to light and to achieve the process of justice away from any politicization.[6]

III. Progress in the investigation

A. A secure environment for cooperation

16. The Commission remains mindful of the essential role played by witnesses and confidential sources as its investigation progresses and of the importance of identifying individuals prepared to appear as witnesses in future trials.

17. In light of the above, the Commission has refined its procedures to accommodate any potential witness who appears to be in physical danger in a secure environment. According to these procedures, persons considered by the Commission to have significant information relevant to the investigation, and whose testimony will likely be required in future judicial proceedings, will be considered eligible for protection if the Commission determines that they are in physical danger as a result of their cooperation.

18. To ensure continuity, the Commission's procedures on witness protection will be shared and coordinated with the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the Registry at the Tribunal.

19. A number of countries approached by the Commission have also indicated their willingness to cooperate with the procedures of the Commission in accepting witnesses and confidential sources who require protection. Measures have been taken to ensure the safety and security of those at risk, both during the life of the Commission and after transition to the Special Tribunal.

B. Investigative challenges

20. Operational challenges of varying magnitude are inherent to complex investigations. There are, however, additional challenges that are specific to the Commission's investigation, some of which have been noted in past reports.

21. During the reporting period a number of these challenges have had an impact on the progress of the Commission's work.

22. First, the Commission has faced difficulties in obtaining potentially sensitive information for investigative purposes.

23. The Commission also frequently sends formal requests for assistance for specific information to Member States. The Commission is mindful of the burden imposed on States in responding to such requests. While the vast majority of requests are responded to in a timely and comprehensive manner, the Commission notes that late or incomplete responses slow progress in the investigation.

[6] See Ministerial statement of 12 August 2008.

24. Finally, the Commission continues to have a pressing need for expertise in a number of key specialized areas. It will continue to seek the support of Member States to meet this need on a timely basis.

C. Progress achieved since the last report

25. For every inch of progress there is a mile of effort. Progress in an investigation is as much about excluding some leads as following up on others. During the reporting period, certain information collected was deemed reliable, and led to further investigation, while other information resulted in the exclusion of certain leads.

26. Those responsible for the attacks were professional and took extensive measures to cover their tracks and hide their identity. Much of the Commission's activity at this point in the investigation focuses on piercing this smokescreen to get at the truth.

1. Hariri investigation

27. The investigation into the Hariri case is actively continuing in all areas. During the reporting period, the Commission's work has included forensic examinations, gathering and analysis of information from a wide range of sources and 288 interviews.

28. Progress has been made. However, to describe particular aspects of such progress would also be to publicize the identity of persons who may have information relevant to the investigation and to put their lives in jeopardy. It may also compromise investigative opportunities currently being pursued as it would advertise the Commission's next steps.

29. In its previous report, the Commission stated that it had gathered evidence establishing that a network of individuals, the "Hariri network", acted in concert to carry out the assassination of Rafiq Hariri (S/2008/210, para. 25).

30. As a result of investigative and analytical work, the Commission has identified new information that may allow the Commission to link additional individuals with this network. Corroborating information has been obtained from a variety of sources and this information has reinforced the Commission's finding that members of the Hariri network are associated with other attacks.

31. The Commission has also continued its investigation relating to the identification of the suicide bomber in the Hariri attack. Investigative activity during the reporting period included collecting additional soil, sand and water samples from States in the region, including additional isotopic investigations. The results of these activities assist in the identification of the possible geographic origin of the suicide bomber.

32. It is widely known that the "money trail" is often key in investigations of terrorism. With that in mind, the Commission has placed renewed emphasis on reviewing financial transactions that may relate to the attacks. The Commission's investigation in this area has already revealed leads that are being pursued.

33. The Commission has also completed and reviewed the inventory of exhibits, including exhibits previously held by the Lebanese authorities. This inventory

consists of a total of over 10,000 forensic exhibits, including more than 7,000 that relate to the Hariri case.

2. Other investigations

34. Under its current mandate, the Commission is directed to assist the Lebanese authorities in the investigation of 20 attacks other than the Hariri attack. Investigations of these other cases also support the Hariri investigation.

35. In its last report, the Commission stated that the Hariri network, or parts thereof, were linked to some of the other cases within the Commission's mandate (ibid.).

36. Since that time, the Commission's investigation has found additional elements to corroborate those links. The Commission has also identified a potential link between one other investigation and the Hariri case. Given the sensitivity of this area of the investigation, no further details can be provided at this time.

37. A report comparing explosives used in the Hariri case to those used in all other cases which may reveal additional links, is also expected soon.

38. The results of recently conducted forensic examinations have revealed information regarding the explosives used in certain of the targeted attacks within the Commission's mandate and their placement in the vehicles used in the attacks.

39. Moreover, forensic examinations in five of the targeted attacks revealed new DNA profiles and fingerprints from the vehicles and other items used in the attacks. This new information increased the total number of fingerprints and DNA profiles found on items likely to have been handled by the perpetrators of the crimes.

40. The Commission has also been provided with a weapon that was allegedly used in the attack on former Minister Pierre Gemayel. The Commission has sent this weapon to a foreign laboratory for ballistics analysis to determine whether it was indeed used in the attack. Results are expected in the coming weeks.

41. Since March 2008, 29 persons have been indicted in connection with the case of the twin bus bombings in Ain Alaq.[7] Technical assistance was provided to the Lebanese authorities on the analysis of explosive devices used in the attacks and the results were handed to the Lebanese authorities. The Commission also found four DNA profiles in relevant areas of the crime scene, which were provided to the Lebanese judicial authorities for possible use in their proceedings.

42. A significant amount of investigation work related to all the cases within the Commission's mandate remains to be done. The Prosecutor will need to continue the investigation into these cases once he assumes his office in order to establish which cases are connected to the Hariri case in the manner required under the statute of the Tribunal.

[7] On 13 February 2007, two buses in the village of Ain Alaq, near Beirut, were bombed, resulting in the death of three people and injuries to 20 others. See S/2007/150, paras. 86-90.

IV. Cooperation with national and international authorities

A. Lebanese authorities

43. The Commission continues to maintain regular contact and interact closely with the Lebanese authorities on matters related to its investigation, as well as on matters relating to the security of the Commission and its staff.

44. The Commission continues to be extremely grateful to the Lebanese security forces for their relentless and effective support and assistance in protecting the Commission's staff and premises, without which it could not continue its work.

45. The Commission continues to cooperate with the Lebanese authorities. As the investigation continues, first under the auspices of the Commission and then the Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, it is expected that the same level of cooperation will be provided.

46. The Prosecutor General of Lebanon remains the main interlocutor of the Commission. Since the last report there has been a dramatic increase in the number and complexity of requests for assistance made to the Lebanese authorities. These authorities have responded with dispatch and in a comprehensive manner and the Commission thanks them for this cooperation.

47. During the reporting period the Commission also held meetings with the investigative judge for the Hariri case and the judges assigned to other cases within the Commission's mandate.

48. As the investigation progresses, the Commission continues to share with the competent Lebanese authorities the substance of all relevant information obtained. The Commission recognizes that it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Lebanese authorities to detain or release individuals in Lebanon. In that regard, the Commission has continued to provide to the Lebanese authorities all the information that they need to make an independent determination on detention issues without resort to the Commission. The Commission has also provided its views on these issues to the Prosecutor General.

B. Syrian Arab Republic

49. Since its previous report, the Commission has submitted 24 requests for assistance to the Syrian Arab Republic, which provided responses within the deadlines specified by the Commission. The Syrian authorities have also, during the period, facilitated nine missions to the country.

50. The Commission acknowledges the logistical and security arrangements made by the Syrian authorities for its missions. The cooperation provided by the Syrian authorities continues to be generally satisfactory.

51. The Commission will continue to request the full cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic in the discharge of its mandate.

C. Other States

52. Out of the 619 requests for assistance issued by the Commission during the reporting period, 96 were sent to 40 Member States other than Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.

53. Member States responded positively to the Commission's requests. The Commission thanks Member States for their continued support and commitment to its work and renews its request for timely and complete responses.

V. Transition

54. The current mandate of the Commission ends on 31 December 2008. On 30 November 2008 the Secretary-General announced that the Special Tribunal is fully on track to commence functioning on 1 March 2009. In light of the situation, an extension of the mandate of the Commission is requested to enable the continuation of the Commission's investigations until the start of the Tribunal's operation.

55. During this extension period, the Commission would gradually transfer operations, staff and assets to The Hague with a view to completing the transition by the time the Special Tribunal starts functioning. As stated by the Secretary-General,[8] staff will continue to be employed by the Commission during this entire period, that is until 28 February 2009.

56. This phased relocation will allow the Office of the Prosecutor to have the staff required to be fully operational in The Hague by the time the Special Tribunal starts functioning. All measures should be taken to avoid any delay in investigative activities planned for this period.

57. On the day the Special Tribunal commences its functions, the Commissioner will assume his functions as Prosecutor and take the lead in the investigation.

58. No indictment will be filed until the Prosecutor is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to meet the applicable legal threshold. When this happens, he will submit an indictment to the pre-trial judge for confirmation.

59. A chart providing an overview of the investigation and prosecution process envisaged for the Tribunal is provided in the annex to the present report.

VI. Conclusions

60. The Commission remains committed to the investigation of the crimes within its mandate.

61. The Commission's mandate currently ends on 31 December 2008 and the Secretary-General has announced that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is fully on track to commence functioning on 1 March 2009. The Commission therefore requests that its mandate be extended to 28 February 2009, so that it can continue its

[8] S/2008/734, para. 21.

investigation without interruption and gradually transfer operations, staff and assets to The Hague.

62. There remains a significant amount of additional investigation work that must be undertaken in all the cases within the Commission's mandate. The Prosecutor will therefore need to continue the investigation into these cases once he assumes his office in order to establish which cases are connected to the Hariri case in the manner required under the statute of the Tribunal.

63. Both the Commission and the Office of the Prosecutor will need the unwavering support and full cooperation of all Member States in order to be able to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions.

64. The Lebanese people have shown a genuine commitment to the cause of justice. As the journey towards justice continues, this commitment must be matched with a respect for an independent and impartial judicial process that leaves no room for either a predetermined schedule or a prejudged outcome.

Annex


Mandate extension
31 December 2008
Yes
No
Commission
Commission ceases activities
Phased move to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Investigation continues
Special Tribunal for Lebanon starts functioning
1 March 2009
Registry
Defence
Chambers
Assistance – other States
Assistance – Lebanese Authority
Evidence from International Independent Investigation Commission
Prosecutor
Prosecutor leads investigation
Hariri investigation
Investigation of other cases
Connected to Hariri case
Prosecutor decides to indict
Prosecutor decides to indict
Pre-trial Judge confirms indictment
Issues warrant of arrest or summons
Accused appears before the Trial Chamber
Does not appear
Trial in absentia if accused: (a) consents (b) has not been handed over, or (c) has absconded or cannot be found
Not guilty plea
Guilty plea
Prosecution case
Defence case
Judgement: in public and by majority
Acquittal
Conviction
Sentence
Appeal

United Nations S/2008/753

Security Council

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Letter dated 2 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to communicate to you that, on Monday, 1 December 2008, two gunboats belonging to the Zionist entity intercepted the Libyan ship *Al-Marwa*, which was headed to the port of Gaza in order to deliver humanitarian aid destined for children and the sick, who are suffering from illness and starvation because of the Zionist blockade. After collecting information regarding the ship and its crew and threatening to destroy it should it enter the port of Gaza, the gunboats forced the *Al-Marwa* to stop its journey and made it turn back.

We should like to emphasize that the United Nations and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent may inspect the Libyan ship in order to verify that it is on a humanitarian mission and that its cargo is only foodstuffs and medicines, namely:

- 360 tons of flour
- 40 tons of rice
- 1,150 boxes of oil
- 798 boxes of condensed milk
- 6 tons of medicines

In addition to its Libyan captain, the ship carries a crew of 13, a representative of the Libyan Fund for Aid and Development in Africa and three journalists.

We request that the Security Council take urgent action in order to allow the ship to enter the port of Gaza and unload its cargo.

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Giadalla A. **Ettalhi**
Permanent Representative

08-63085 (E) 021208 021208

United Nations S/2008/754

Security Council

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3 December 2008
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 2 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to our letter to you No. 4/2/2202 dated 2 December 2008 concerning the Libyan ship *Al-Marwa* which was bound for the port of Gaza carrying humanitarian aid, and in view of subsequent serious developments, please be informed that I have received urgent instructions from the Government of my country to request the convening of an emergency meeting of the Security Council.

We therefore hope that you will take the necessary measures to convene an emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss this issue. I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Giadalla A. **Ettalhi**
Permanent Representative

08-63246 (E) 031208 031208

United Nations S/2008/755

Security Council

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3 December 2008

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Letter dated 3 December 2008 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to request that, in accordance with its previous practice, the Security Council invite the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the meeting of the Security Council, which is to be held on Wednesday, 3 December 2008, regarding the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer

08-63266 (E) 031208

United Nations S/2008/756

Security Council

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9 December 2008

Original: English

Letter dated 3 December 2008 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to my letter dated 30 November 2007 (S/2007/695) informing the President of the Security Council of the progress made by the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, and his reply of 5 December 2007 (S/2007/710), in which he took note of my intention to continue the activities of the United Nations support team to the Mixed Commission with funding from the regular budget. In the same spirit, by the present letter, I would like to inform you of the latest achievements and activities undertaken by the Mixed Commission. As you know, the United Nations established the Mixed Commission to facilitate the implementation of the 10 October 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice on the Cameroon/Nigeria boundary dispute. Through my good offices, and with the support of the United Nations Secretariat, I have continued to facilitate the implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice.

The mandate of the Mixed Commission includes supporting the demarcation of the land boundary and delineation of the maritime boundary, facilitating the withdrawal and transfer of authority along the boundary, addressing the situation of affected populations and making recommendations on confidence-building measures. In the course of 2008, the Mixed Commission has been able to facilitate the process smoothly and peacefully, and to keep an open dialogue and communication between the two countries. The following are some of the activities for which the United Nations support team to the Mixed Commission has provided substantive, technical and logistical support.

Achievements to date in the implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice include withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area (December 2003), along the land boundary (July 2004) and in the Bakassi peninsula (June 2006). The delineation of the maritime boundary was completed in May 2007, and the boundary line transposed onto an agreed map in March 2008. Concerning the demarcation of the 1,950 kilometre land boundary, the Mixed Commission expects to complete two of four field assessments along the boundary by the end of 2008, amounting to a total assessed boundary length of approximately 1,250 kilometres, at least 180 kilometres of which require further clarification. Concerning the physical demarcation, the majority of preliminary mapping and preliminary large-scale mapping through satellite imagery have been completed, as has the contract which provides survey control stations used to carry out the final survey of constructed pillars. The first quality assurance contract was completed in 2008.

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Reports by United Nations civilian observers monitoring the situation in areas of withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area, along the land boundary, and in the Bakassi peninsula have concluded that the prevailing situation concerning the rights of affected populations is satisfactory. In addition, the Mixed Commission has continued to support the formulation of confidence-building measures to ensure the security and welfare of these affected populations and promote initiatives to enhance trust between the two Governments and their people. Initiatives on social amenities within the Lake Chad area continue to be promoted, and support for resource mobilization for the Lake Chad Basin Commission was provided in 2008.

In accordance with the Greentree Agreement of 12 June 2006, the transfer of authority from Nigeria to Cameroon of the remaining "Zone" of the Bakassi peninsula was successfully completed on 14 August 2008, marking a critical milestone in the implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice and the peaceful resolution of the boundary dispute between the two countries. In preparation for the handover, the follow-up Committee, which was established to monitor the implementation of the Greentree Agreement, continued to hold regular meetings preceded by field visits. The Committee met once on 11 July 2008 in Geneva, and plans to meet again in the course of December 2008.

In 2009, the Mixed Commission will continue to provide Cameroon and Nigeria with surveying and cartographic support to facilitate the joint field assessment in connection with the demarcation of the land boundary. The Mixed Commission expects to cover the remaining length of the land boundary field assessment in 2009. It will oversee the implementation of projects by external contractors, including the start of boundary pillar emplacement, which should be completed in 2011. Following a request from the parties, the Mixed Commission intends to provide, in 2009, substantive guidance and engage in legal and technical capacity-building with Cameroon and Nigeria with a view to facilitating, by 2010, the resolution of areas of disagreement arising from the field assessment. All remaining land boundary demarcation activities are expected to be completed by 2012.

With regard to the maritime boundary, negotiations are expected to continue in 2009 to help Cameroon and Nigeria agree on modalities for exchanging information on the exploitation of oil and gas fields in the vicinity of the maritime boundary, paving the way for cross-border cooperation in this field in the near future.

Meanwhile, in 2009, United Nations civilian observers will continue to monitor the situation of affected populations in the Lake Chad area, along the land boundary and in the Bakassi peninsula. In Bakassi, the Greentree Agreement provides for a special transitional regime of five years in the "Zone" during which special legal protection shall be granted to Nigerian residents, an arrangement which will require continued monitoring and reporting by United Nations observers. Moreover, the Nigerian Government has called upon the United Nations to provide coordinated assistance and support to its voluntary repatriation programme for the transfer of its citizens from Bakassi. The Chairman of the Mixed Commission shall ensure leadership in the coordination of United Nations supported projects implemented by United Nations country teams operating in Cameroon and Nigeria.

In addition, the United Nations will continue to advise the parties on the implementation of confidence-building measures and projects to promote joint

economic ventures, cross-border cooperation and environmental safeguards, all of which are necessary to ensure the sustainability of good neighbourliness between them. Key areas identified for action by the Governments and their partners include food security, education, health, water and basic infrastructure, including the rehabilitation of the Mutengene-Abakaliki cross-border road. Ongoing support to the Lake Chad Basin Commission will be required, taking into consideration the provisions of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, as and when appropriate.

After 2009, the following activities will conclude the work of the Mixed Commission:

(a) Assisting the parties in addressing remaining areas of disagreement arising from the field assessment;

(b) Coordinating and certifying demarcation contracts, including the completion of pillar emplacement by 2011, and all remaining land boundary demarcation activities by 2012;

(c) Following up and supporting the activities of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Gulf of Guinea Cooperation Council;

(d) Promoting cross-border cooperation, including maritime cooperation on oil and gas fields straddling boundaries and joint security monitoring along the land boundary, and reviving the Joint Bilateral Commission which existed between the two countries;

(e) Implementing exit strategies by handing over the activities of the Mixed Commission to the Joint Bilateral Commission and other subregional structures.

I would like to underscore that, up to 2003, the Mixed Commission was funded entirely from extrabudgetary funds. During the period from 2004 to 2007, the activities of the Mixed Commission were funded through the United Nations regular budget. The Governments of Austria, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden and Uruguay have provided in kind support for the substantive and technical work of the CNMC (military and legal experts), in addition to the logistical support provided by the Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria, and the voluntary contributions of the two countries, Cameroon and Nigeria, as well as of Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Union to the trust fund for the demarcation activities.

Given the cost-effectiveness of the mission and the important tasks remaining at this juncture to help advance the peaceful implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice, it is my intention to ask for resources from the regular budget for the Mixed Commission for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

United Nations S/2008/757

Security Council

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9 December 2008

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Letter dated 9 December 2008 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 3 December 2008 (S/2008/756) concerning your intention to continue the activities of the United Nations support team to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, with funding from the regular budget, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the information contained in your letter and the intention expressed therein. They also urge the members of the Mixed Commission to work with international donors to seek further voluntary contributions.

(*Signed*) Neven **Jurica**
President of the Security Council

08-63964 (E) 101208

United Nations A/63/586–S/2008/758

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The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-third year

Identical letters dated 3 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations committed from 15 to 30 November 2008 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

08-63322 (E) 091208 101208

Annex to the identical letters dated 3 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Israeli violations, acts of aggression and other activities from 15 to 30 November 2008

Air violations

On 15 November 2008, between 1112 and 1155 hours, four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Tripoli and heading north as far as Baalbek-Hirmil. They circled over Shikka, Tripoli, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving over the sea off Naqurah.

On 16 November 2008, between 1130 and 1245 hours, four Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Shuf, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 18 November 2008, at 1900 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh at an altitude of 13,000 feet and heading north. It circled over areas of the South before leaving over Rumaysh at 0250 hours on 19 November 2008.

On 24 November 2008:

- Between 0700 and 1510 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over areas of the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving over Naqurah;
- Between 0945 and 1000 hours, four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Dayr Mimas and heading north. They circled over various regions of Lebanon before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 25 November 2008, between 0800 and 1230 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft circled over Tibnin, Bint Jubayl and Nabatiayah. Meanwhile, warplanes circled over Bint Jubayl and Marj 'Uyun. The aircraft left at 1110 hours.

On 26 November 2008, six Israeli enemy warplanes and a single Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace as follows:

- At 0720 hours, a reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over Naqurah. It circled over the South, the Bekaa, Beirut and Mount Lebanon before leaving over Naqurah at 2215 hours;
- At 1300 hours, four warplanes violated Lebanese airspace over Naqurah, heading north as far Tripoli. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over the sea off Naqurah at 1400 hours;
- At 1305 hours, two warplanes violated Lebanese airspace over the occupied Shab'a Farms, heading north as far Tripoli. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 1540 hours.

On 27 November 2008:

- Between 1032 and 1055 hours, two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They headed north as far as Shikka before leaving over the sea off Naqurah;

- Between 1102 and 1252 hours, two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b;

- Between 1310 and 1530 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering from over the sea off Naqurah. It proceeded as far as Shikka and circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub and the South before leaving over Naqurah.

On 29 November 2008, between 0955 and 1355 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and heading north as far as Jazzin. It circled over areas of the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 30 November 2008, between 0825 and 2100 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b and heading north. It circled over areas of the South and Beirut before leaving over Naqurah.

Sea violations

On 17 November 2008:

- At 1217 hours, from a position 50 metres south of the line of buoys and 2,400 metres off the coast, an Israeli enemy military launch fired an explosive charge in order to chase away two Lebanese fishing vessels that were 200 metres north of the line of buoys;

- At 1856 hours, from its position at Radar opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch shone a searchlight towards a Lebanese fishing vessel that was 20 metres north of the line of buoys and 500 metres off the coast.

On 21 November 2008, at 2238 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight for eight seconds from a military launch towards Lebanese territory, directing it at the road leading to the Lebanese Army post at Ra's al-Naqurah.

On 24 November 2008, at 2150 hours, in the open sea off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch shone a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters.

On 26 November 2008, inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch shone a searchlight towards Lebanese fishing vessels inside Lebanese territorial waters, as follows: 10 seconds at 0325 hours; 10 seconds at 1740 hours; 5 seconds at 1900 hours; and 15 seconds at 1920 hours.

Acts of aggression in the field

On 18 November 2008, at 1320 hours, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising eight soldiers crossed 60 metres past the line of withdrawal between Halta and Kafr Shuba, east of Bastra farm.

On 19 November 2008, between 1730 and 1830 hours and between 1940 and 2045 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight from the Zar'it barracks towards Lebanese territory, directing it at civilian cars travelling along the main road and at the Lebanese Army post at Jabal Balat.

On 20 November 2008, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight from the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin-Tarbikha-Jabal Balat triangle as follows: for 20 seconds at 1740 hours; for 30 seconds at 1741 hours; for 30 seconds at 1825 hours; and for one minute at 2010 hours.

On 22 November 2008:

- At 1850 hours, two Israeli enemy machines shone a searchlight for eight minutes towards Lebanese territory, from Ra's al-Naqurah to Labbunah;
- At 2033 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight for two seconds from its position at the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin-Jabal Balat triangle.

On 23 November 2008, between 0405 and 1735 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight for one minute from its position at the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin-Jabal Balat triangle.

On 24 November 2008:

- Between 1730 and 2055 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight for 22 seconds from its position at the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin-Tarbikha-Jabal Balat triangle;
- At 2125 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight for one minute towards the Marwahin triangle.

On 26 November 2008, at 1720 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight for 12 seconds from its position at the Zar'it barracks towards the Jabal Balat position; the enemy repeated this exercise at 1805 hours for a period of 50 seconds.

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Identical letters dated 3 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical table of the violations committed by Israel by air, sea and land during the month of November 2008 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Permanent Representative

08-63310 (E) 041208 051208

Annex to the identical letters dated 3 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statistical table showing Israeli violations during November 2008

Air violations					*Land violations*					
Military jet	*Reconnaissance*	*Helicopter*	*Total*	*Sea violations*	*Military acts of aggression*	*Field violations*	*Breaches*	*Total*	*Overall total*	*Previous month's violations*
				Crossing of territorial waters, and firing of automatic-weapons rounds, flares and flare shells over territorial waters	Air raids, artillery shelling, shelling of military positions and important posts, attacks on and killing of civilians	Gunfire, launching of flare shells, dropping of artillery shells, infiltration and crossing of international borders	Threats and display of weapons, bulldozing of soil, placing of barbed wire and setting up of installations inside Lebanese territory			
11	**15**	**—**	**26**	**11**	**—**	**17**	**—**	**17**	**54**	**42**

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1834 (2008) of 24 September 2008, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) until 15 March 2009 and stated its intention to authorize the deployment of a United Nations military force to follow up the European Union-led military force (EUFOR) in Chad and the Central African Republic, subject to a decision of the Security Council.

2. This report provides an update on developments related to the mandate of MINURCAT since my last report dated 12 September (S/2008/601) and the briefing of my Special Representative to the Council on 19 September (see S/PV.5976). The report outlines preparations, made in close cooperation with the European Union, for the transfer of authority from EUFOR to a United Nations military component, including options on the size, structure and mandate of the proposed United Nations military presence in Chad and the Central African Republic.

II. Update on recent developments

A. Political developments in Chad

3. On 15 September, President Idriss Déby issued a decree, reappointing or reassigning new governors in all 22 regions of the country, and appointing new *préfets* and *secrétaires généraux* in all 60 departments. On 9 October, the President issued a decree, restructuring the territorial administration, including the establishment of four new administrative regions.

4. Some limited progress was made during the reporting period towards the implementation of electoral reforms. The Parliament, which opened its second session on 6 October, received a briefing on the draft bills related to the electoral law and the establishment of the National Electoral Commission as provided for under the agreement of 13 August on electoral reform. The Government has yet to approve and submit the draft bills to the Parliament for its formal consideration.

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5. Efforts to normalize relations between Chad and the Sudan, as provided for in the Dakar Agreement of 13 March 2008, continued. In this context, from 11 to 15 October, an African Union delegation, led by the former President of Burundi, Pierre Buyoya, visited N'Djamena. In meetings with senior officials, including President Déby, the African Union delegation emphasized its support for the Dakar Agreement and urged the Government to fulfil its commitment to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Sudan.

6. In accordance with an agreement reached at a tripartite meeting hosted by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in Tripoli, on 22 and 23 October, the Governments of Chad and the Sudan exchanged ambassadors on 9 November.

7. On 15 November, at the conclusion of its meeting in N'Djamena, the Dakar Agreement Contact Group issued a communiqué stating that it had approved an evaluation mission aimed at finalizing the arrangements for the establishment of a peace and security force along the border between Chad and the Sudan. The peace and security force concept provides for the deployment of an observation and monitoring force to commence in January 2009. In addition to the establishment of observer posts, Chad and the Sudan are each to station 1,000 troops at their respective borders.

8. On 17 November, the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur, Djibril Bassolé, met with President Déby in N'Djamena to exchange views on the Darfur crisis and its impact on Chad. With regard to the normalization of relations between Chad and the Sudan, President Déby expressed the hope that agreements reached would now be implemented.

9. As part of a familiarization visit to east Africa, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, visited Chad from 13 to 15 October. In his meeting with President Déby, the latter confirmed Chad's acceptance of the deployment of a United Nations follow-on force as envisaged by the Security Council in its resolution 1834 (2008). The President also emphasized the importance of the role of MINURCAT in facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

B. Central African Republic

10. In the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic, there were no major political developments related to the mandate of MINURCAT. However, on 8 November, the Sam Oundja refugee camp, with a population of some 3,000 refugees from Darfur, was attacked by an unidentified armed group. Following the incident, EUFOR successfully evacuated nine humanitarian workers to Birao.

C. Security situation

11. The security situation, particularly in eastern Chad, remained unchanged. With the end of the rainy season, the possibility of renewed rebel attacks has increased. Over the last few months, both the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) and rebel groups were reported to have strengthened positions on their respective sides of the Chad-Sudan border in anticipation of a possible offensive.

12. In the meantime, the previously reported trend of carjacking, armed robberies and crimes targeting humanitarian workers, Chadian citizens and refugees continued unabated. On 17 September, a group of unidentified armed men forcibly entered the compound of the non-governmental organization (NGO) International Relief and Development, in Goz Beida, and stole property. In the incident, two staff members sustained machete wounds and two guards were injured. The bandits escaped with cash and property. On 27 September, eight men in military uniform reportedly broke into the office of the NGO Solidarités, and stole cash and equipment.

13. Médecins Sans Frontières reported to MINURCAT that on 9 November, a group of unidentified armed men attacked some villages mainly occupied by the Tama ethnic group in the vicinity of the town of Birak, about 60 km south-east of Guéréda. Local authorities confirmed that eight civilians were killed, several others were injured, and some 240 to 300 houses were destroyed.

14. On 15 November, EUFOR reported that two Sudanese MI-24 helicopters had fired upon its road patrol, near Birak in eastern Chad. No casualties were sustained but two EUFOR vehicles were destroyed.

15. The United Nations Mine Action Service confirmed that as a result of conflicts in the 1980s and in recent years, vast quantities of unexploded ordnance and other explosive remnants of war remain scattered across eastern Chad. This continues to pose serious security risks for the population and those working in support of the provision of humanitarian assistance. In this regard, the Mines Advisory Group, which has been working in Abéché and Am Zoer since July 2008, has recorded that 17 persons were killed and another 87 injured by mines and unexploded ordnance in the first six months of 2008. Seventy per cent of the victims were children. In an effort to mitigate the threat, a United Nations mine action team was deployed to MINURCAT headquarters in mid-2008 to coordinate and monitor unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of War clearance activities.

D. Humanitarian situation

16. Eastern Chad continues to face an acute humanitarian challenge. Over 290,000 Sudanese refugees, more than 180,000 internally displaced persons and a further 700,000 individuals among the host communities are in need of food, water and health care. At present, an estimated 500,000 persons are receiving assistance. Until relative security can be assured, refugees and internally displaced persons are unlikely to return to their places of origin and will continue to depend heavily on external assistance. At the same time, however, the prevalence of attacks by heavily armed bandits targeting humanitarian workers continued to seriously undermine their capacity to reach people in need.

17. In the Am Nabak refugee camp (Wadi Fira region), on 6 October 2008, a group of women forcibly entered an area where staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were registering refugees. The incident degenerated into a violent attack against UNHCR and NGO workers. Gendarmes from the Commission Nationale pour l'Accueil et la Réinsertion des Réfugiés eventually restored order with the help of EUFOR and evacuated the humanitarian workers. To date, the security situation in the camp has precluded their return.

18. Since the 26 July 2008 carjacking attempt involving a staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who was shot and wounded (S/2008/601, para. 16), only essential activities have been maintained in Kerfi, such as the provision of water and health care. A reconciliation process, supported by UNHCR and MINURCAT, began in September between the various communities in Kerfi in an attempt to stabilize the situation.

19. The Consolidated Appeals Process workshop for 2007/08 was held in N'Djamena on 3 and 4 September 2008. Of the US$ 288 million targeted for 2008, to date only 53 per cent has been provided by donors. The significant shortfall will prevent the implementation of numerous projects to address the needs of the most vulnerable. To avert this situation, the Central Emergency Response Fund has injected some US$ 6.5 million to support underfunded projects earmarked in this Consolidated Appeals Process, as other resource mobilization efforts continue.

20. From 21 to 24 November, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes, visited Chad to assess the humanitarian situation and response particularly in eastern Chad. In his meeting with senior Government officials, including Prime Minister Youssouf Saleh Abbas, Mr. Holmes shared his assessment that the situation of the refugees and internally displaced persons was unlikely to be resolved in the immediate future. In stressing that the principle of voluntary returns must be upheld, he advocated the development of strategies aimed at self-sustainability. He further expressed concern over the prevalence of attacks on, and harassment of, humanitarian aid workers.

III. Implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT

21. As at 24 November, MINURCAT was comprised of 863 personnel, including 236 United Nations police officers and 46 military liaison officers. The majority of these personnel are located in N'Djamena (headquarters) and Abéché. Efforts to project the mission's presence in Guéréda, Goz Beida, Farchana and Birao are ongoing. With the aim of enhancing the activities of the Mission in support of its mandate in the east, my Deputy Special Representative recently relocated her office from N'Djamena to Abéché.

A. United Nations Police and the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité

22. During the reporting period, a number of key steps were taken towards the training and deployment of Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS) to locations in eastern Chad. On 27 September, President Déby signed the decree formally establishing DIS. A list appointing 71 DIS commanders and specifying their assignments was presented by the Chadian authorities to MINURCAT on 10 October. Chadian authorities and MINURCAT have agreed on a timetable for the DIS deployment to five key police stations (Abéché, Farchana, Guéréda, Goz Beida and Iriba) and 12 police posts (in close proximity to the 12 UNHCR refugee camps) in eastern Chad. On 16 October 2008, the President signed a second decree appointing the Commander of DIS together with two Deputy Commanders (one in charge of operations and the other in charge of the administration). The first group, comprised of 29 officers, was deployed to Abéché on 24 October. DIS officers now

maintain a presence in Abéché (58), Goz Beida (53), Farchana (51) and Iriba (17). Further deployments are under way.

23. MINURCAT has completed the training of 109 new DIS officers. The graduation ceremony for the new trainees took place on 28 October, in N'Djamena. Allowing for attrition, the total number of trained officers now stands at 418. The next course, for 222 officers, started on 24 November. If suitable candidates are available and the current training schedule is maintained, the target of training 850 DIS officers may be achieved by January 2009.

24. The major logistical challenge affecting the United Nations police and DIS deployment has been the acute shortage of suitable accommodation and infrastructure, and skilled labour to undertake construction work. To date, MINURCAT has constructed four of the five planned police stations for the United Nations police and DIS. At the fifth site, Guéréda, tented office accommodations will be necessary until logistics constraints can be overcome. Generators and 22 DIS vehicles have been deployed to the five locations. Until the accommodation facilities can be secured, it was agreed that DIS officers would make private arrangements to live within the community and receive an additional allowance. Nevertheless, tents have been made available to DIS.

25. A total of 118 United Nations police officers are now stationed in the aforementioned five stations (Abéché (40), Farchana (34), Guéréda (4), Goz Beida (24) and Iriba (16)), and are conducting visits to 11 police posts. Owing to insecurity, travel to the twelfth post, close to the Oure Cassoni refugee camp (north-east of Bahai), has not been possible.

B. Justice and corrections

26. During the reporting period, the Government of Chad appointed 180 new magistrates who are to be deployed throughout the country, predominately in the east. MINURCAT continued its efforts to identify the needs for the justice and corrections institutions. This included the conduct of assessment missions to Farchana, Biltine, and Iriba. A follow-up mission to Iriba was carried out with representatives of the Central Prison Administration to identify areas of urgent intervention. The Mission has continued to provide advice to the Chadian Prison Administration both at the headquarters level, in N'Djamena, and at the local level, in Abéché and Iriba.

27. MINURCAT continued to conduct, in liaison with the Ministry of Justice and with Abéché and Biltine judicial authorities, a comprehensive assessment of the status of the judiciary in eastern Chad. To that effect, MINURCAT has conducted several field missions to Abéché, Goz Beida and Biltine, together with UNHCR.

C. Civil affairs

28. The political and civil affairs presence of MINRUCAT continued to be strengthened. In Kerfi (Dar Sila region), where intercommunal tensions remain high, MINURCAT has sought to promote inter-community dialogue through educational programmes sponsored by UNHCR, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Programme and the Ministry of Education. In Farchana, the limited water

supply remains a source of potential tension. In this regard, MINURCAT has been working with the local community to develop strategies with a view to reducing tensions.

D. Human rights

29. During the reporting period, MINURCAT conducted human rights investigation and monitoring missions to the Oure Cassoni, Am Nabak, Iridimi, Touloum, Farchana Bredjine, Treguine, Gaga and Djabal refugee camps. In addition, MINURCAT staff visited the internally displaced person sites in Koloma and Gourounkoum and several villages and towns, including Hadjer Hadid, Iriba, Biltine, Goz Beida, Toumtouma and Borota. During these visits, MINURCAT staff documented multiple cases of rapes, including two cases involving minors in the Farchana refugee camp. In one of the cases, the alleged assailant was arrested and detained by the gendarmerie. In Goz Beida, the alleged rape of an 8-year-old girl is the subject of an ongoing investigation by the local authorities.

30. A United Nations country team verification exercise to collect and verify reports of child recruitment in eastern Chad commenced its work in August 2008. Within this framework, MINURCAT undertook verification visits to the Oure Cassoni, Iridimi, Bredjine and Treguine refugee camps from 1 to 5 September 2008. The team documented 30 cases of alleged recruitment of child soldiers in the camps, including assertions of the involvement of the Darfur rebel group Justice and Equality Movement.

31. On the basis of these findings, MINURCAT has urged the relevant authorities to conduct investigations and, where appropriate, to take action. MINURCAT, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations agencies and humanitarian actors, continues to urge the local authorities to identify, arrest and prosecute persons alleged to be recruiting or facilitating the recruitment of children in the camps and surrounding villages in eastern Chad.

E. Gender

32. From 6 to 8 October, MINURCAT conducted a workshop on the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence against refugee and internally displaced women, and on Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). The workshop, opened by the First Lady of Chad, Hinda Déby Itno, brought together 53 representatives, from Government, NGOs, civil society and the United Nations country team. Further to this initiative, on 20 November, MINURCAT organized a train-the-trainers workshop for 52 women in Goz Beida.

33. MINURCAT continued to support efforts to increase representation of female officers within DIS. On 15 September 2008, a MINURCAT training session took place with 50 new female DIS recruits to make them aware of issues involved in providing adequate and appropriate protection of women and children. From 13 to 17 October, the Mission provided a further ten training sessions for the new DIS recruits, which included 71 women.

F. Mission support

34. As noted above, with the construction of four new police stations MINURCAT increased its capacity to deploy and sustain United Nations police and DIS in eastern Chad. Construction of the fifth station and accommodation facilities is ongoing. On 27 November 2008, MINURCAT and the Government of Chad concluded a memorandum of understanding on the premises rehabilitated by MINURCAT for use as DIS police stations and MINURCAT offices. The endorsement of the memorandum of understanding will enable construction of new sites to proceed. At the same time, the Mission continues to devote extensive resources to the planning and preparation for the deployment of a United Nations force.

G. Safety and security

35. During the reporting period, the security phase remained at IV in northern and eastern Chad and III in N'Djamena and southern areas. The security phase in northern and eastern Chad remained at phase IV owing to continued border tensions, banditry and continued risks of criminality that have complicated access to vulnerable populations.

H. Military liaison officers

36. MINURCAT military liaison officers (44 of the 50 authorized strength) continue to liaise with EUFOR in N'Djamena, Abéché, Farchana, Goz Beida, Iriba, Guéréda, and Birao in the Central African Republic. During the reporting period, MINURCAT deployed four military liaison officers to establish a presence in Iriba.

IV. EUFOR deployment

37. At present, 3,300 EUFOR troops are deployed in the area of operation. On 5 November, the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, signed an agreement with the Russian Federation, on the deployment of four helicopters and approximately 100 personnel to EUFOR.

38. During the reporting period, EUFOR continued to work closely with MINURCAT. This included the provision of escorts for MINURCAT and DIS convoys. EUFOR continued to conduct patrols, focusing on areas of insecurity to local populations, internally displaced persons, refugees, and humanitarian staff. Visits to 500 villages were undertaken as a means of building confidence among the local population and enhancing security.

V. Expanded MINURCAT presence post-EUFOR

39. In its resolution 1834 (2008), the Security Council requested an update on the planning and preparations for the transfer of authority from EUFOR to a United Nations military force on 15 March 2009, including options on the size, structure and mandate of the proposed military presence in the Central African Republic.

40. For this purpose, a United Nations technical assessment mission (comprising representatives of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, and Safety and Security, as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and MINURCAT) was deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic from 6 to 13 October. As a result of their assessment and discussions in the field, the proposed plan for the force, as previously presented (S/2008/601, paras. 63-81), has been further refined.

41. In the meantime, consultations are ongoing between the United Nations Secretariat and troop-contributing countries and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic, with the purpose of securing the necessary arrangements for the deployment of the United Nations force. In addition, a EUFOR technical team undertook a week-long visit to New York in October to work with the United Nations planning team. It was agreed that such joint planning sessions will continue to be undertaken.

42. On 28 October, the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations, Ahmad Allam-Mi, sent a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/679), copied to me, setting out his Government's understanding that the operation to be undertaken by the United Nations force "is not a conventional peacekeeping one implying some kind of 'neutrality', 'impartiality' or 'good offices' within the framework of any type of peace agreement", that the force should not exceed 3,000 troops and that it should be better equipped than EUFOR. Subsequently, the Chadian authorities provided MINURCAT with a memorandum that sought to specify the United Nations force structure and composition and its areas of deployment.

43. In late October, senior representatives of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support held consultations with the Permanent Representative of Chad and with members of the Security Council on the concept for the new force.

44. Senior representatives at Headquarters also visited Chad to further consult the Government of Chad on the future United Nations presence. From 3 to 6 November, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Susanna Malcorra, visited Chad to assess the challenges of MINURCAT deployment, particularly those pertaining to the transition from EUFOR to a United Nations force. In her meetings with senior Government officials, she was advised that discussions on the necessary logistical arrangements, such as site transfers, could proceed only in the context of broader consultations on the concept of operations for the new force.

45. For this reason, the Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations, Lieutenant General Chikadibia Obiakor, undertook a visit to Chad from 12 to 14 November to consult the national authorities on the refined concept. Throughout these consultations, Lieutenant General Obiakor sought to address the concerns of the Government.

46. In the course of these consultations the Chadian authorities reiterated the points cited in the above-mentioned letter from the Permanent Representative of Chad. They also expressed concern over the demands that such a force would place on the environment. Further, the Government representatives shared their assessment that the security situation had improved and would continue to do so. In this context, they referred to the recent deployment of additional national forces

along the border with the Sudan and the expectation of the deployment of the peace and security forces.

47. At the end of the consultations, the Chadian authorities indicated a willingness to accept some 3,500 troops. In doing so, they set out their expectations of the force structure including battalion strength, areas of operation and enabling elements. Finally, the authorities expressed their appreciation for the visit of Lieutenant General Obiakor and the expectation that there would be the opportunity for further dialogue. Subsequently, my Special Representative engaged with the Government of Chad and was informed on 18 November that the Government was prepared to accept a United Nations force of not more than 4,500 troops.

48. In my meeting with President Déby in Doha on 29 November 2008, he agreed to the deployment of a United Nations force presence of some 4,900 troops. With regard to the finalization of the relevant judicial and legal agreements, President Déby stressed the need for the technical experts to work together on the details. For this purpose, a United Nations team comprising of experts will travel shortly to N'Djamena.

VI. United Nations force concept of operations

49. The United Nations force design has been based on an analysis of threats and potential spoilers, the terrain, key mandated tasks, and the capabilities of EUFOR and United Nations forces to mandate implementation, as well as on EUFOR lessons learned.

50. Notwithstanding the complex causes of insecurity in the MINURCAT area of operations, on a day-to-day basis, attacks by heavily armed bandits pose the most immediate and constant threat to the civilian population and humanitarian operations. The threat is criminal in nature. It manifests itself, predominately, through the use of military firepower, including heavy weapons. Countering this threat requires more than policing and calls for military deterrence. In cases where this does not succeed, military intervention is required.

51. The proposed force's operational activities would be calibrated towards achieving the objectives of deterring hostilities, reassuring the civilian population, enhancing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT, as well as providing protection for United Nations personnel and installations.

52. The extreme challenges posed by the geography, the climate and the fluid security situation demand a highly mobile and responsive force. The proposed United Nations force would provide a robust and effective security presence, one that projects deterrence through visibility and presence both on land and in the air.

53. This would entail a force capable of conducting 24 security patrols daily across the area of operations, supported by a battalion size mobile reserve force able to provide a surge capacity in response to an emerging threat.

54. In comparison with EUFOR, the proposed United Nations force would have a larger operational area and additional responsibilities. The latter entails the provision of an enabling security environment in which the recently commenced deployment of lightly armed DIS can operate.

55. As with EUFOR, in addition to an air mobile troop-carrying capability, any United Nations force requires sufficient military engineering and communications resources. Unlike EUFOR, it is further anticipated that the United Nations force presence will continue over the next year and beyond. Accordingly, such a force would require the establishment of enduring logistical support, in particular facilities for accommodation, sanitation and water. Until the necessary logistical structures can be put in place, infantry battalions would need to be deployed on a self-sustaining arrangement for the initial 12-month period. Within each battalion there would need to be a light field engineering capacity.

56. The United Nations would need to discuss with Member States the contribution, on a bilateral basis, of an in extremis commitment to mitigate developing crises. The purpose of such support would be for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and assets in the event the United Nations force is unable to cope with the situation.

A. United Nations force in Chad

57. The concept for the United Nations force as previously presented (S/2008/601, paras. 63-81) comprising some 6,000 troops has been further refined. Possible reductions have been identified that would provide for a force of some 4,900 troops. In developing this concept, careful consideration has been given to the continued concerns expressed by the Government of Chad. (The proposals for the force presence in the Central African Republic are outlined separately in paras. 63-64 below.)

58. The force would be configured to have an enduring presence in six sites of half a battalion each (initially at Iriba, Guéréda, Farchana, Goz Beida and later at Bahai and Koukou-Goz Amer). This would entail battalions of the standard United Nations strength of 800 troops, and a battalion-size mobile reserve supported by 18 helicopters.

59. The refined force concept reflects adjustments to the helicopter support troops, signals units, special forces and reconnaissance units, as well as some logistical elements. They are deemed operationally achievable, although not ideal, as they reduce the logistical support and enablers to the minimum. Any further reduction in the force would significantly impact on its effectiveness and situational awareness.

60. The force's ability to sustain operations in a period of crises would depend on the contribution of troops that are not subject to national caveats. It would depend, among other elements, on the rapid response reserve being deployed and operational in the early stages of the transition.

61. With the plan to establish sites in Bahai and in the vicinity of Koukou-Goz Amer, as well as a presence in the Central African Republic, the United Nations force would generate an increased demand for air assets for operations and logistics support.

B. Central African Republic

62. The current activities of EUFOR in the Central African Republic are limited to securing the Birao airfield and the conduct of patrols in and around its immediate

vicinity. The above-mentioned United Nations technical assessment mission visited Bangui and Birao on 10 and 11 October, and met with representatives of the Government of the Central African Republic, EUFOR, MINURCAT, the United Nations country team and the humanitarian community. On the basis of those discussions, it was assessed that the main security threats were in the north-west and south-east of the country. While cross-border activity by armed elements in the north-east cannot be ruled out, the team did not assess that there were enduring and significant threats in the area. In response to the specific request of the Security Council that the United Nations establish a military presence in north-eastern Central African Republic to follow on from EUFOR, the main options considered were as follows:

(a) **Option 1**: A small military detachment to liaise with local authorities and key actors, maintain limited situational awareness and assess the condition of the Birao airfield and determine maintenance requirements. This option entails a small military liaison team of approximately 15 officers (based in Chad) that will conduct routine visits to Birao;

(b) **Option 2**: A military detachment to provide force protection for one consolidated site, project limited longer range patrols within the area of operations, maintain a quick reaction force, and undertake air field maintenance. This option entails a reinforced detachment consisting of two manoeuvre Companies and one enabling support Company, plus a small military aviation section (some 500 troops, all ranks);

(c) **Option 3**: A force that can project deterrent and reconnaissance patrols in the area of operations (out to 350 km), maintain a quick reaction capability, maintain and secure the Birao airstrip, and provide force protection for one consolidated site. This option entails a manoeuvre motorized infantry battalion task force, with organic air mobility, a horizontal engineer section, and trauma surgical medical capabilities (some 1,000 troops, all ranks).

63. In the light of the technical mission's assessment of the prevailing risks, reinforced by EUFOR's current tasking, the recommended military presence is option 1. Should a sustained presence be required, or the prevailing conditions and threat change, option 2 is considered to provide the best balance of operational presence, situational awareness and resource allocation.

VII. Force generation and military planning

64. On 19 September, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations briefed potential troop- and police-contributing countries on the initial concept of operations for the Mission. This was followed by a more detailed briefing on military and support concepts to potential troop-contributing countries on 2 October and an informal meeting of troop-contributing countries on 25 November. Subsequently, notes verbales soliciting commitments of troops and resources to a United Nations force in Chad and the Central African Republic, subject to a Security Council mandate, were sent to potential troop contributors during the first week of November.

65. To date, 16 countries have indicated a willingness to positively consider contributing to a MINURCAT force. One potential contributor has indicated the

possibility of contributing to the helicopter requirement. A number of other potential contributors have indicated that, while they could provide troops, specific commitments would depend on prior confirmation that the key enablers have been secured.

66. All efforts are being made to ensure that there is not a security vacuum during the transition. To this end, my staff are working closely with EUFOR contributors to secure the maximum number of troops committed to re-hat.

67. The United Nations is presently recruiting the core force Headquarters staff, which would be based at the Secretariat to refine operational plans. They would then deploy to the force headquarters in Chad in early 2009. The sector battalions and reserve force, as well as the requisite logistic support, transport, medical and aviation capabilities, will need to be in place in Abéché during the early stage of the transition. This will depend on the United Nations receiving commitments for sufficient troops and assets.

VIII. Arrangements for a MINURCAT post-EUFOR presence

68. In my previous report (S/2008/601, para. 79), I stated that for a seamless transition to occur, an agreement with the Government of Chad on the transfer and use of the EUFOR sites to the United Nations, together with infrastructure and water drilling rights, will be required prior to the transfer of authority. A draft memorandum of understanding formalizing the agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Chad on the handover of the use of all EUFOR sites to MINURCAT is being prepared.

69. Following the transfer of authority on 15 March 2009, the United Nations force will progressively build up with new troop contributors. Subject to the decision of the Security Council, a presence in Birao will also be established. Deployments of troops and equipment will be severely constrained during the rainy season. The full force strength will be achieved only after October 2009.

IX. Benchmarks for withdrawal of MINURCAT

70. In consultation with the Headquarters Integrated Mission Task Force, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme, UNHCR and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as MINURCAT, the following benchmarks have been developed towards the exit strategy of MINURCAT:

(a) Voluntary return and resettlement in secure conditions of a critical mass of internally displaced persons;

(b) Demilitarization of refugee and internally displaced person camps as evidenced by a decrease in arms, violence and human rights abuses;

(c) Capacity of local authorities to provide the necessary security for refugees, internally displaced persons, civilians and humanitarian workers;

(d) Ability of the national law enforcement agencies to maintain law and order with respect for international human rights standards;

(e) Progress of an independent and effective judiciary in eastern Chad contributing to end impunity, as evidenced by a significant increase in the capacity and independence of, and respect for, the justice sector;

(f) A strengthened prison system in eastern Chad that is based on a human rights approach to prison management.

71. These benchmarks will be reviewed as the situation evolves and will form the basis of the Mission's implementation plan.

X. Observations and recommendations

72. The recent steps taken by the Governments of Chad and the Sudan towards normalizing their relations, including the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, signals their intent to address the sources of instability regionally. These are positive steps that need to be consolidated so that stability in the region may be restored and the lives of those affected will no longer be at risk.

73. It remains the responsibility of the Governments of Chad and the Sudan to ensure that their respective territories are not used to harbour armed opposition groups. In this regard, I applaud the commitment of the Government of Chad to negotiate an end to the conflict and call on the leadership of the Chadian armed opposition groups to lay down their arms and address their grievances through political forums.

74. I wish to acknowledge the key role that the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to play in facilitating the dialogue between the concerned parties. Should these efforts require the assistance of the United Nations, my good offices remain open.

75. With regard to the efforts of the Chadian people to establish a viable democratic system of governance, the adoption of legislation on electoral reforms will signal the resolve of the Government to an inclusive process. The full implementation of the agreement of 13 August will require sustained commitment from all the parties and key stakeholders. I am grateful for the support provided to them by the European Commission and United Nations country team.

76. These efforts will not, however, bear fruit in the long term unless the two critical issues of impunity and the armed opposition are comprehensively addressed. The Government of Chad is encouraged to take a strong stand in ending impunity for criminal actions.

77. Technical support for efforts to strengthen the rule of law in accordance with international human rights conventions will need to be sustained. In this regard, the level of cooperation between the Government of Chad with MINURCAT and the United Nations country team and the ongoing commitment of donors are encouraging.

78. Donors have been generous in their support to the MINURCAT managed trust fund. To date, donors have pledged US$ 21.6 million of which US$ 18 million has been received. This has enabled MINURCAT to facilitate the DIS programme. Based on the current rate of spending for the DIS programme, it is projected that the trust fund will be exhausted by the first quarter of 2009. MINURCAT is working closely with the European Union and other donors towards the holding of a donors'

conference in Brussels early in 2009. This will include an overall assessment of the DIS programme and should consider the proposal made by the Government of Chad that the overall number of DIS personnel be doubled. I would encourage donors to continue to provide the necessary support to the trust fund.

79. Until the situation at the border can be stabilized and the rule of law established, the majority of the refugee and internally displaced person populations in eastern Chad will continue to require humanitarian assistance. Reports of ongoing recruitment of child soldiers and the existence of arms and armed men in refugee camps and internally displaced person sites in the region are particularly disturbing. I also remain deeply concerned over the continued threat to humanitarian workers, who have been forced in some cases to close down their operations. I admire the dedication and commitment of humanitarian workers who risk their lives to ensure that basic life support assistance is provided to vulnerable groups.

80. Over the last year, EUFOR has facilitated the conditions under which such assistance can be delivered. With the EUFOR mandate coming to an end on 15 March 2009, the United Nations has developed and further refined a concept of operations for the follow-on United Nations force.

81. This concept is premised on the same mandate as EUFOR. Given the enduring nature of the new force's deployment and the considerable logistical requirements, my experts have concluded that the minimum requirement for the force is some 4,900 troops.

82. Timely provision of key enablers and the maximum re-hatting of EUFOR troops will facilitate a smooth transition to be effected. The operational capability of such a force will depend on its ability to enjoy full freedom of movement and to be perceived as impartial.

83. I welcome the Government of Chad's agreement to the concept for the United Nations force of 4,900 troops. In this context, I wish to acknowledge the constructive spirit of dialogue that the United Nations has enjoyed in its dialogue with the Government of Chad, in particular with President Déby, his Minister of External Relations and the leadership of the Coordination Nationale d'Appui à la Force Internationale.

84. I welcome the spirit in which the Government of Chad has recently concluded the memorandum of understanding with the United Nations on premises rehabilitated by MINURCAT for use by DIS police stations and MINURCAT offices. This is encouraging in view of the requirement for the timely conclusion of the agreements upon which the deployment of the United Nations force will be contingent. Equally, prior to the deployment of the new force, it will be necessary to finalize the status-of-forces agreement and the memorandum of understanding transferring all sites and infrastructure currently utilized by EUFOR to the United Nations.

85. I encourage all Member States, particularly those already participating in EUFOR, to contribute to the new force the necessary troops and support elements. Critical elements include a level II hospital and air assets.

86. With regard to the request of the Security Council for options on the Central African Republic, the Government of the Central African Republic has been consulted and has indicated a willingness to accept a United Nations force presence

in the north-east of the country. In that spirit, I have proposed three options for a United Nations force.

87. On this basis I submit to the Security Council for its consideration and authorization the proposals contained in section VI above, as they relate to a United Nations force presence in Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic.

88. In connection with the development of a concept that supports a smooth transition between EUFOR and the United Nations, I would like to express appreciation for the continuing cooperation of the European Union and the EUFOR Operational Commander, General Patrick Nash.

89. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Victor Angelo, and to the dedication demonstrated by the men and women of MINURCAT, the United Nations country team, the humanitarian community and EUFOR in their efforts to contribute to peace, security and development in Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic.

MINURCAT
Planned Deployment
as of November 2008
Area of operation
International boundary
Provincial boundary
National capital
Provincial capital
Town, village
Refugee camp
Internally displaced persons camp (IDP)
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
N'Djamena Deployment
HQ
FHQ Support
Reserve
Recon
SF
MP
LOG
Level 2
Mr-Con
BORKOU-ENNEDI-TIBESTI
WADI FIRA
NORTHERN DARFUR
SUDAN
BATHA
OUADDAI
WESTERN DARFUR
CHAD
SILA
GUERA
SALAMAT
MOYEN-CHARI
SOUTHERN DARFUR
YAKAGA
BAMINGUI-BANGORAN
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Fada
Berdoba
Bahai
Teriba
Iriba
Tina
Am Nabak
Guéréda
Kulbus
Am-Zoer
Abeche
Biltine
Farchana
Andé
El Geneina
Al Sireaf
Oum Hadjer
Ati
Chokoyan
Koundjoubay
Masteri
Satay
Mornei
Zalingei
Nertiti
Am Dam
Am Gereda
Kango Haraza
Habila
Am Charamit
Ade
Garsila
Makokou
Goz Beida
For Baranga
Mongo
Nyala
Mukjar
Koukou Angarana
Teddji
Gabasour
Abu Déia
Rehed al Bardi
Melfi
Am Timan
Nyimeri
Tulus
Zakouma
Tissi
Am Dafok
Birao
Haraze
Manou
Campement de Grounda
Duanda Djallé
Campement de Koumbala
Ouandjia
Kaouadja
0 100 200 300 km
0 100 200 mi
Map No. 4349 UNITED NATIONS
December 2008
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

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Security Council

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Twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), in which the Council requested me to report every four months on compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains and every six months on the return of all Kuwaiti property, including archives, seized by Iraq. Since June 2006 the frequency of reports on the compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains has been reduced from every four months to every six months (S/2006/468 and S/2006/469). My reports under paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) now cover both issues: Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and property. My twenty-sixth report (S/2008/405) was submitted in June 2008.

2. In a letter dated 26 March 2008 (S/2008/206), the Security Council requested a comprehensive report, 12 months after the appointment of the new High-level Coordinator (the Coordinator), to include an update on progress during that period, as well as an assessment of the progress that might be achieved, including the conditions that might be necessary and a timescale for the completion of the mandate.

II. Background

3. The Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf have all addressed issues pertaining to the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains as well as the return of Kuwaiti property. The 15th Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008, strongly condemned the grave violation of human rights and the killing of Iraqi, Kuwaiti and other third-country nationals by the former Iraqi regime, in disregard of the provisions of international law and international humanitarian law. The Non-Aligned Movement also called for measures to be taken to bring to justice those responsible for committing such crimes.

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4. The 108th session of the Ministerial Council of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 2 September 2008, urged the United Nations to continue its efforts to finalize the issues of the return of the national archives to Kuwait and the fate of the remaining prisoners and missing persons from Kuwait and other States.

5. The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting in Cairo from 2 to 8 September 2008, condemned the grave human rights violations that took place during the occupation of the State of Kuwait and the concealment of the facts relating to the prisoners and missing persons of Kuwaiti and other nationalities, the bodies of a number of whom were found in mass graves. The Council expressed its deepest sympathy to the families of the victims whose remains had been identified and its concern for the suffering of the families of those whose whereabouts continues to be unknown. It commended the cooperative attitude of the Government of Iraq and the efforts it is exerting with a view to bringing to light the fate of all those Kuwaiti and other missing persons and prisoners.

6. The Final Communiqué of the Annual Coordination Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, held in New York on 26 September 2008, welcomed the official invitation extended by the Government of Iraq to Gennady Tarasov, the High-level Coordinator, to visit Iraq to pursue dialogue on outstanding issues which would help cement the existing friendly relations between Iraq and Kuwait. The meeting condemned the mass killings of innocent Iraqis by the former regime and considered them crimes against humanity. The meeting demanded the trial of those responsible and called upon Member States and the international community not to provide refuge to officials of the former regime who have committed such crimes against Iraqis and others.

III. Recent activities with regard to the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains

7. At the invitation of the Government of Iraq, Mr. Tarasov visited the country from 12 to 15 October 2008. It was the Coordinator's first visit to Baghdad after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Mr. Tarasov was received by Barham Saleh, Deputy Prime Minister, and had meetings with Mouaffaq al-Rubaie, National Security Adviser, Hoshyar Zebari, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wijdan Mikhail Salim, Minister for Human Rights, and Mohammed Hajj Hamoud, Deputy Foreign Minister and Head of the Legal Affairs Department.

8. Mr. Tarasov briefed his Iraqi interlocutors on the implementation of the mandate and stressed the need for the renewed joint efforts of all parties with a view to achieving practical results as soon as possible. He indicated that the security situation in Iraq appeared to have improved to a level that allowed for the resumption of exhumation work at sites known to contain the remains of the Kuwaiti prisoners of war and assessment of new mass graves. In addition to stressing Iraq's responsibilities under paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), the Coordinator highlighted the catalytic role any progress on this essentially humanitarian matter could have on further building trust between Iraq and Kuwait and deepening the neighbouring countries' overall engagement with Iraq.

9. It was confirmed to Mr. Tarasov at all levels that Iraq is genuinely interested in improving its relations with Kuwait and other Gulf countries. While Iraq would like the mandate to come to a close as early as possible, it was willing to achieve closure through accelerated cooperation and attaining progress on the issues of the missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals as well as archives. The Iraqi interlocutors stressed their commitment to pursuing this goal. They expressed their sympathy to the families of the missing persons, noting at the same time the suffering which the Iraqi people had endured under Saddam Hussein's regime.

10. The Minister for Human Rights explained that her Ministry was the sole entity legally authorized to exhume graves in Iraq. She acknowledged that progress on the issue of Kuwaiti prisoners of war was constrained owing to a lack of capacity. The Ministry has only one technical team comprised of 12 individuals, which is responsible for exhumation activities in all of Iraq. At present, these resources are allocated to the exhumation and identification of victims of the former regime as well as casualties from the Iran-Iraq war.

11. In view of the limited capacities of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, Staffan de Mistura, my Special Representative for Iraq, offered the provision of technical assistance through a contracted specialized team to perform exhumation work or a capacity-building project to train additional Ministry of Human Rights staff. The offer, made in the context of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on human rights and deepening Iraqi engagement with its neighbours was appreciated by the Iraqi side. Following further consultations with the Government of Iraq, UNAMI will be formulating a relevant project.

12. As a practical measure, the possibility of restarting the exhumation work in the Ramadi area (where the Kuwaiti specialized teams recovered several sets of human remains in 2004 and an eyewitness claimed to know the burial locations of Kuwaiti missing persons) was examined at the meeting with the Minister for Human Rights. This issue was also raised with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Coordinator stressed the importance of ensuring Iraq's thorough preparation for the meetings of the Tripartite Commission and its Technical Subcommittee in Kuwait from 17 to 19 November 2008. He encouraged Iraq to actively make use of these important mechanisms for taking significant steps towards achieving tangible progress on the ground.

13. From 16 to 19 November 2008, Mr. Tarasov travelled to Kuwait. He was received by Sheikh Mohammad Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had working meetings in the Ministry, met with the Kuwaiti National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoners of War Affairs (Kuwaiti Committee for Missing Persons), the Head of the Regional Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Head of ICRC Operations for the Middle East and North Africa. He also met with a representative of the Kuwaiti Airways Corporation.

14. The Coordinator shared information and views he had received in Baghdad with his Kuwaiti interlocutors and reiterated the call for collective efforts by all parties to bring the long-standing issues of the missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, as well as the archives, to a satisfactory resolution.

15. The Kuwaiti officials welcomed Mr. Tarasov's useful and timely mission to Baghdad. They pointed out that Kuwait was interested in maintaining good-

neighbourly relations with Iraq and did not want the mandate to be unnecessarily prolonged. Kuwait's interest lay solely in resolving all pending humanitarian issues, which remains at the top of the country's agenda and continues to cause suffering to the bereaved families. The Kuwaiti officials believed that every tangible effort on the part of Iraq would improve chances to achieve practical results and thus expedite the realization of the mandate. Kuwait looks forward to cooperating with the High-level Coordinator and appreciates the stance taken by the members of the Security Council.

16. Mr. Tarasov was informed by the members of the Kuwaiti Committee for Missing Persons of the results of the thirty-first meeting of the Tripartite Commission and the fifty-eighth session of its Technical Subcommittee. Chaired by the ICRC, these sessions were attended by representatives of the State of Kuwait, the Republic of Iraq, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Republic of France.

17. The Kuwaiti Committee for Missing Persons, while sharing the view that the security situation in Iraq had improved and allowed for the resumption of the search and exhumation activities, showed their disappointment at the lack of progress since the last meeting of the Tripartite Commission in November 2007. They cited a field mission to Ramadi which had been planned but did not take place as well as several other activities that had been previously agreed upon and reflected in the protocols of the Technical Subcommittee. No visits to burial sites in Iraq were conducted in 2008. Problems were also reportedly encountered in dealing with witnesses.

18. The Coordinator was informed that the Technical Subcommittee had decided to increase the frequency of its meetings and will now meet bi-monthly instead of every six months. He was also told that Kuwait would like to restart investigations in early 2009 at a mass grave site in Iraq. This would be a low-key mission followed by subsequent trips and, finally, exhumation if the site contains remains of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals.

19. Members of the Kuwaiti Committee for Missing Persons advised Mr. Tarasov that one more person from the list of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals had been identified and his file had been closed. This was confirmed in a letter addressed to the Coordinator by the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, dated 26 November 2008. The total number of those whose mortal remains have been identified has therefore reached 236 (see annex). I extend my heartfelt condolences to their families.

20. No new information was received on the fate of the missing American Serviceman, Captain Michael Scott Speicher. His case remains open.

IV. Recent activities with regard to the return of Kuwaiti property

21. No credible facts or possible leads have emerged since my last report regarding the missing Kuwaiti national archives. The Coordinator in his meetings in Baghdad stressed the need for additional efforts to determine their whereabouts. Some of his Iraqi interlocutors, noting that they could only speculate, said that the Kuwaiti archives could still be somewhere inside or outside the country. The fact,

however, remains: the archives — the value and importance of which the Kuwaiti officials stressed again during the Coordinator's stay in Kuwait — have not been found.

22. It should be recalled that Kuwait, based on information received from the Embassy of Iraq in the country, informed the Coordinator that it was the intention of Iraq to return radio and television tape recordings which allegedly were part of the Kuwaiti archives (S/2008/405, para. 24). In developments reflected in the correspondence between the Coordinator and the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations in September 2008, Mr. Tarasov was informed that Kuwait had contacted the Embassy of Iraq in Kuwait with a view to ascertaining a date for receiving the tapes either through the Embassy or at the border between Iraq and Kuwait under the supervision of the United Nations. The Coordinator stated his readiness to witness the handover of the aforementioned tape recordings during his planned trip to Kuwait in November 2008.

23. As requested by Kuwait, Mr. Tarasov raised the issue of the handover in his conversations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq. He stressed that its occurrence on the eve of the session of the Tripartite Commission would serve as an indication of Iraq's good intentions and readiness to undertake concrete steps towards the implementation of the mandate. The United Nations offered to facilitate the transportation of the tapes to Kuwait.

24. Despite all efforts, the tape recordings were not transferred to Kuwait prior to or during the Coordinator's visit there as planned. This is regrettable as it would have been a timely symbolic and practical step to show movement on the issue of missing Kuwaiti property.

V. Observations

25. The inactivity on the exhumation and repatriation of the remains of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals during the last year is of serious concern.

26. I am also concerned at the absence of progress with regard to finding the Kuwaiti archives. Despite constant encouragement by the Coordinator and myself, no data has emerged from those who may possess information that could lead to ascertaining the whereabouts of the Kuwait State and historical documents. Nor has anyone confirmed or substantiated that the archives have been destroyed.

27. In my previous reports I welcomed the continuation of the essentially humanitarian process launched by the provisions of paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and noted the positive stance taken by the Iraqi authorities. I remain of the same view today. I would like to stress, however, the need to translate statements of goodwill into concrete activities to speed up progress on the ground and, thus, the implementation of the mandate. My appeal is directed to Iraq, as the side responsible for returning the Kuwaiti prisoners of war and archives, as well as to other parties concerned.

28. I welcome the support of UNAMI to the efforts being made by the Coordinator and look forward to its practical arrangements in support of the Ministry for Human Rights of Iraq in accordance with the UNAMI mandate.

29. The Tripartite Commission remains the primary mechanism for dealing with the issue of the missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals. I am grateful to the International Committee of the Red Cross for its consistent endeavours in this regard.

30. I reiterate my previous calls addressed to all urging earnest collaboration and practical involvement. I sincerely hope that the quality of effort will increase and progress will be made during the coming months. I believe it is important for Iraq and Kuwait to bring closure to these issues.

31. I plan to submit the comprehensive report, referred to in paragraph 2 of the present report, to the Security Council in April 2009. In this regard, the Coordinator has begun consultations with the parties concerned.

Annex

Names of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals whose remains have been identified

1. Saad Meshal Aswad Salamah Al-Enezi
2. Ahmed Abdullah Abdulrasul Al-Ghallaf
3. Saleh Ali Said Al-Hayani
4. Enam Said Ahmad Said Ismail Al-Edan
5. Abdullatif Hussein Al-Waheb
6. Naser Hussein Omaran Al-Enezi
7. Mahmoud Sayed Reda Sayed Hasan
8. Faihan Mohammad Laili Al-Mutairi
9. Nasser Sherif Fahed Al-Khaldi
10. Daad Omar Al-Hariri (Lebanese)
11. Jassem Hamid Abdallah Al-Samak
12. Safah Ibjad Aloush Al-Mutairi
13. Lafi Faihan Mohammad Laili Al-Mutairi
14. Abdul Rahman Saad Marzook Al-Otaibi
15. Mohammed Gazai Saad Ali Al-Mutairi
16. Farhan Harbi Saket Al-Dhafiri
17. Obaid Falah Husaini Al-Mutairi
18. Hamad Mohammad Ghuneim Al-Ajami
19. Taleb Amin Jassem Saleh
20. Fahed Sulayman Aswad Al-Enezi
21. Fahed Akil Rakan Al-Zufayri (Saudi)
22. Misfir Mhana Misfir Al-Sharifa Al-Hayani
23. Nasser Ayed Duhayran Al-Oteibi
24. Mohammad Nasser Sharid Al-Ajami
25. Assal Turki Kusayman Al-Ajami
26. Abdallah Sulayman Abdallah Al-Amir
27. Abdulaziz Yussef Abdulaziz Alyamani
28. Amer Deydan Ali Al-Ajami
29. Sobhi Khalil Nousouhi Haydar (Lebanese)
30. Raja Hamud Saleh Al-Sahli
31. Khaled Saleh Al-Tuwaygeri

32. Adel Fahed Hamad Al-Hamad
33. Fahed Khalifa Jadlan Al-Mutayri
34. Salem Obeid Abdallah Al-Mutayri
35. Shojah Madi Omar Al-Ajami
36. Habib Saleh Al-Zaqah
37. Ali Abdallah Ali Al-Duwaysan
38. Maayuf Jaber Sahud Al-Harbi
39. Yaccoub Yussef Bader Al-Ustaz
40. Mansour Tulayhan Samar Al-Mutayri
41. Hamad Humaydi Ghazi Al-Otaibi
42. Mohsen Mohammad Mohsen Al-Ajami
43. Rajeh Zeyab Bedah Nahar Al-Mutayri
44. Mansour Faleh Nasser Al-Thaqeb
45. Ahmad Mahmoud Al-Hattab (Egyptian)
46. Jaber Helal Shedid Al-Shemary
47. Falah Jaser Saad Guniman Al-Mutayri
48. Jatly Mohammad Mejaed Al-Mutayri
49. Husain Salem Faza Al-Shamry
50. Khalifa Trak Suliman Al-Shamry
51. Adel Faleh Satam Al-Fadly
52. Adnan Mohamad Bahbahani
53. Tareq Falah Alaeban Al-Shamry
54. Hamoud Nafel Saeid Al-Harshany
55. Nabil Ali Ramadan Bushehry
56. Mutlaq Ali Salman Al-Adwani
57. Waleed Saad Mubarak Al-Asaf
58. Abdulah Fares Ayed Al-Shamry
59. Bader Nahar Mefrij Al-Mutayri
60. Matar Saket Mater Al-Mayai Al-Anezi
61. Waleed Ayoub Ismail Bander
62. Helal Saleh Malis Al-Mutayri
63. Abdulaziz Abdullalif Abdulaziz Al-Kharaz
64. Mubarak Saleh Herzan Malis Al-Mutayri
65. Hamoud Ebrahim Harfan Al-Sahly
66. Saad Murshid Jasir Al-Barazi

67. Raeid Abdulla Khalil Burashid
68. Saleh Hamoud Mansour Hamoud
69. Abdulmehdi Mehdi Ali Tahir
70. Hussam Mohammad Abdulmohsen Al-Oseimi
71. Abdalla Al-Oweyhan
72. Hussein Mohammad Jomah
73. Hassan Abdulmohsen Al-Ali
74. Mohammad Makboul Al-Otaibi
75. Ali Hassan Awad Al-Azmi
76. Hamoud Nassir Baanoun El-Enezi
77. Khalaf Akil Ali Al-Dhafiri
78. Saad Bashir Mubarak Al-Rashidi
79. Mohammad Rashid Nabi Al-Duwaila
80. Nawaf Abdulla Farraj Al-Mutairi
81. Saleh Mathal Jasser Al-Mutairi
82. Mohammad Ahmad Shaher Al-Sharifi
83. Abdulla Deydan Kazar Al-Dhafiri
84. Maged Jaber Fyhan El-Enezi
85. Tarek Mohammad El-Qahtany
86. Meshal Jazza El-Enezi
87. Fawzy Ali Ebrahim Al-Mulla
88. Saleh Naser Al-Khenah
89. Esam Yaccoub Saadallah
90. Meshal Yussef Ali Reda
91. Hany Ahmed Al-Musilikh
92. Ahmed Ali Al-Kandary (Iranian)
93. Abdulaziz Ali Mohammad Al-Khanini
94. Fauzi Ebrahim Abdullatif Al-Abed Al-Jalil
95. Mohammad Naeif Muthri Al-Shamry
96. Jamal Mubarak Muwanas Al-Muwanas
97. Salah Jassem Mandani Qassem Ghullam
98. Abdullah Shafi Hafiz Al-Shagban Al-Ajami
99. Qadir Abdulrahman Jassem Mustafa
100. Ismail Ebrahim Mohammad A. Al-Kandary
101. Yacoub Hussein Ali Akbar

102. Mohammad Ali Saleh Al-Zaqah
103. Ahmad Abdulla Mustafa Hadi
104. Waleed Feiruz Yaqout Al-Manea
105. Mohammad Ahmad Mohammad Al-Rashed
106. Saoud Abdulaziz Furaih Al-Kouh
107. Khaled Abdulaziz Furaih Al-Kouh
108. Ali Mohammad Ali Salem
109. Adnan Feiruz Yacout Al-Manea
110. Fahed Ali Kamikh Al-Dehani
111. Hani Feiruz Yacout Al-Manea
112. Mohammad Mutlaq Rumeih Al-Bathali
113. Hamad Muajeb Saad Al-Ajmi
114. Mutlaq Abdallah Mutlaq Al-Hajr Al-Mutairi
115. Zakaria Abdulqader Mohammad Al-Qaderi
116. Ahmad Saleh Aboud Al-Enezi
117. Ajmi Awajah Rashid Al-Rashidi
118. Shaker Abdallah Mohammad Al-Jedi
119. Nabil Mohammad Hassan Al-Sharaf
120. Hamoud Marzook Thamer Al-Fadly
121. Khaled Hussein Aoun Al-Atiyah
122. Maysam Rawdan Adnan Jodah Al-Shamry
123. Mohammad Hamoud Ayed Al-Aqail
124. Mohammad Jassem Khalf Al-Thanian
125. Mohammad Mrzook Mohammad Al-Mrzook
126. Mutlaq Abdul Rahman Mutlaq Al-Khalidi
127. Housain Mohammad Hosain Adab
128. Talal Hadi Al-Otaibi
129. Khaled Nasser Fahd Al-Ajami
130. Abdul Razzaq Abdullah Mubarak Al-Fawzan
131. Ali Husain Naserallah Boshahryary (Iranian)
132. Saoud Manea Mohammad Tahous
133. Khaled Ahmed Mohammad Al-Rashed
134. Hamoud Muhareb Ali Al-Shamry
135. Abdullah Fahm Moatesh Al-Mutairi
136. Srour Falah Srour Al-Rashaidi

137. Abdallah Wali Hizam Al-Shamry (non-Kuwaiti)
138. Nasser Fahed Mohammad Al-Ajami
139. Fahed Wali Hizam Al-Shamry (non-Kuwaiti)
140. Mohammad Faleh Abboud Al-Enezi
141. Faisal Ghali Ashwi Al-Dhafiri
142. Nasser Ali Nasser Al-Ajami
143. Nawaf Hamad Hussein Al-Ajami
144. Khaled Nasser Khaled Al-Subaii
145. Alnouri Khalaf Kuwayan Al-Dhafiri (Saudi)
146. Mansour Awad Mansour Al-Ajami
147. Fahed Alhailam Musmar Al-Dhafiri
148. Jamal Abbas Ghaloum Hussein
149. Abdulkarim Ali Khaled Mohammad
150. Mousa Ebrahim Suleiman Al-Khalifi
151. Abdulaziz Ebrahim S. Al-Badyawi (Saudi)
152. Abdulrazaq Dakhil Abdulrazaq Al-Tawalah
153. Hamad Mubarak Salem Al-Hajri
154. Khaled Ahmad Mubarak Al-Sharhan
155. Mohammad Serhan Aswad El-Enezi
156. Fahed Bashir Mubarak Al-Rashidi
157. Ahmad Abdulla Ahmad Al-Kandari
158. Dhafir Abdulhadi Dhafir Al-Rashidi
159. Hamdan Hamoud Ghazi Al-Otaibi
160. Mansour Faleh Nasser Al-Ajmi
161. Salah Ali Murshid Al-Rashidi
162. Meshal Obeid Hamdan Al-Otaibi
163. Hamoud Mohwis Saoud Al-Saidi
164. Mohammad Nasser Hazzah Al-Otaibi
165. Abdullah Salem Salem Gheith
166. Fahed Mohammad Abdulla Al-Khalidi
167. Faisal Zaid Sulaiman Al-Ajeel
168. Husam Ahmad Mohammad Al-Sayafi
169. Salah Abdulla Abdulrahman Al-Majid
170. Mohammad Ali Abdulla Burhameh
171. Nasser Mudaf Ahmad Khalfan

172. Safi Maatouk Aman Al-Felaij
173. Khaled Nouri Sulaiman Al-Qanai
174. Imad Yussef Saad Al-Rashid
175. Ahmad Hussein Bakr Al-Asfour
176. Ahmad Abdulrahman Abdulmohsen Al-Rifai
177. Khaled Ahmad Issa Matar
178. Ali Abdullatif Abdallah Al-Asfour
179. Imad Abdulwahab Hussein Al-Roumi
180. Sami Khalifa Ebrahim Al-Rashed
181. Esam Abdulwahab Hussein Al-Roumi
182. Salah Khalifa Abdalla Al-Derbas
183. Faisal Ahmad Hussein Al-Qattan
184. Jamal Abdul Hamid Essa Al-Attar
185. Mustafa Abdul Hamid Matar Al-Shatti
186. Shaheen Ahmad Majid Al-Shaheen
187. Fahed Ahmad Majid Al-Shaheen
188. Khaled Marzooq Zaid Al-Mutayri
189. Meshal Ahmad Thenian Al-Musailem
190. Ali Zaal Awad Al-Zufayri (Saudi)
191. Abdallah Rahed Ahmad Al-Yacoub
192. Mohammad Naeif Abdallah Al-Enezi
193. Bader Abdallah Ahmad Al-Sharqawi
194. Mahmoud Naeif Abdallah Al-Enezi
195. Khaled Abdullatif Abdallah Al-Mari
196. Mohammad Yousef Said Albaloushi (Omani)
197. Hussein Abdel Amir Ali Mohammad (Iranian)
198. Fahed Ahmad Abdulmohsen Al-Abdulkarim
199. Rashed Zayed Mutlaq Al-Duwailah
200. Adel Ahmad Abdulaziz Al-Raqim
201. Rashid Mazeid Said Al-Mutairi
202. Abdulla Abdullatif Abdulla Al-Asfour
203. Waleed Hamad Al-Fahed Al-Hamad
204. Mohammad Abed Ridha Abbas Ghaloum
205. Samir Jasem Mahmoud Al-Saffar
206. Aref Ebrahim Youssef Al-Dhowaihi (Saudi)

207. Najim Taleq Saoud Al-Muweizri
208. Nasser Hazaa Zaid Alwaalan Al-Mutairi
209. Nasser Sulaiman Farah Al-Shamry
210. Hassan AbdulAziz Qumir Abdullah
211. Khaled Jassem Hamd Al-Derbas Al-Zaabi
212. Shehab Ahmed Shaker Ali
213. Mousa AbdulRidha Abbas Ghaloum
214. Madi Hameed Obaid Al-Mutairi
215. Zaid Saadi Zaid Al-Shamry
216. Hassan Guloum Hassan Sakkin
217. Hussein Abdullah Ahmed Al-Ghallaf
218. Salah Ali Saad Al-Khouder
219. Salah Abdullatif Farhan Al-Doukhi
220. Sayed Mohammad Sayed Ali Musalam
221. Abdul Amir Hussein Ahmad Al-Qattan
222. Adnan Safar Maarafi Maarafi
223. Mohammad Sayed Ali Hamza
224. Muwanas Mubarak Muwanas Al-Muwanas
225. Adel Ebrahim Mohammad Al-Murayshed
226. Murshed Julaydan Mohammad Al-Hamad
227. Khaled Hazzah Hamad Al-Fahed al-Hamad
228. Fayed Mohammad Ali Al-Ayadhi
229. Khalid Yousef Abdullah Essa
230. Khalifa Abdullah Fahad Al-Enezi
231. Jassem Mohammad Hamad Al-Fawzan
232. Khaled Mohammad Farag Al-Shamri
233. Yussef Mohammad Hamad Al-Fawzan
234. Salem Amer Rashed Al-Doueri
235. Fayez Hussein Ali Nazer
236. Mostafa Abdelzazzak Jasim Al-Hassan